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I. INTRODUCTION 
The latter half of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century 
have seen the scientific community’s understanding of biological materials and processes 
progress at a blistering pace.1 In the 1950s, scientists had established little more than the 
basic structure and function of DNA.2 Some six decades later, it is now common practice 
for researchers to pinpoint the exact location of a single protein’s genetic material within 
the human genome and isolate the corresponding segment of DNA, commonly termed a 
“gene,” from the remainder of the genome.3 The location and isolation of human genes has 
wide-ranging utility in scientific and medical communities, and is particularly valuable in 
                                                          
 1. Elizabeth Bailey, Products of Human Ingenuity: The Isolation and Purification of Genes Under the Nat-
ural Product Doctrine, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 25, 25 (2013). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 SCI. 239 
(2005).  
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the domain of clinical genetic testing, where clinicians can determine patients’ suscepti-
bility to various genetically inherited diseases.4 
Just as science has evolved, so too have the views of researchers regarding the ac-
ceptability of patenting various types of discoveries.5 In particular, the patenting of genes 
has become a polarizing topic over the last several decades, garnering attention from the 
media and strong opinions from both supporters and opponents of the practice.6 Tensions 
concerning genetic patents reached a high point with the Supreme Court case Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.7 In the early 1990s, Myriad Genetics (“Myr-
iad”) was one of several research groups participating in the race to locate two genes, 
BRCA1 and BRCA2, associated with susceptibility to breast and ovarian cancers.8 After 
Myriad won this race, it procured multiple patents9 relating to these genes and aggressively 
enforced its rights pursuant to those patents.10 Myriad’s actions forced several genetic test-
ing facilities and researchers to discontinue their BRCA-related testing and research and 
limited patients’ access to its genetic testing services.11 Subsequently, a variety of individ-
uals and organizations filed suit seeking invalidation of Myriad’s patents.12 
After several decisions from lower courts, including two from the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court accepted the case to decide one question: Are 
human genes patentable?13 This issue’s resolution turned primarily on whether the patents 
fell under the “product of nature” exception to the scope of subject matter eligible for 
patent according to Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952.14 In a landmark decision, the 
Court held that isolated segments of DNA are not eligible for patent, while synthetically 
created molecules of cDNA are patent eligible.15 
A full discussion of the issues associated with genetic patents and the effects of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad is beyond the scope of this comment, which focuses 
primarily on the role of innovation policy in the resolution of patent law cases.16 In order 
                                                          
 4. Allen C. Nunnally, Commercialized Genetic Testing: The Role of Corporate Biotechnology in the New 
Genetic Age, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 306, 307 (2002). 
 5. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 77, 109-15 (1999). 
 6. David H. Ledbetter, Gene patenting and licensing: the role of academic researchers and advocacy 
groups, 10 GENETICS MED. 314, 314 (2008). 
 7. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 8. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal rein-
stated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).  
 9. U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. 
Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 
5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed 
Mar. 20, 1998). 
 10. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 204-06. 
 11. Id. at 186-89. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.  
 14. 35 U.S.C. §101 (2011); Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2107. 
 15. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2107-11. 
 16. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003) 
[hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers]; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Spe-
cific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific]; Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U.L. 
2
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to provide the reader with a sufficient understanding of the Court’s holding in Myriad, Part 
IIA endeavors to explain some basic concepts of molecular biology and genetics.17 Part 
IIB introduces the topic of United States patent law, discusses its development in relation 
to the biotechnology industry, and explains in further detail the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of the “product of nature” doctrine.18 Part IIC provides an account of the race to patent the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, Myriad’s actions in patenting the genes and enforcing those 
patents, and the history of the case as it meandered through the various levels of the federal 
court system.19 Part III explores the application of innovation policy to the biotechnology 
industry, analyzes the Federal Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s holdings in Myriad, and ar-
gues that, although Myriad strikes a desirable balance between the competing interests of 
the biotechnology research community, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit never-
theless missed a valuable opportunity to engage in a meaningful discourse about innova-
tion policy and its proper role in the courts’ patent law jurisprudence.20 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief Introduction to Molecular Biology and Genetics 
The hereditary information of every living organism on Earth is stored in molecules 
of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).21 An organism’s cells express its hereditary information 
through the processes of transcription and translation, by which cells synthesize ribonu-
cleic acid (RNA) and proteins, respectively.22 Each protein synthesized within a cell cor-
responds to a specific segment of DNA.23 These specific segments of DNA are genes, and 
the complete DNA sequence of an organism is known as its genome.24 The human genome 
contains approximately 21,500 genes.25 
1. DNA 
DNA is a chain-like molecule that takes the form of a double-helix with base pairs 
on the inside and a sugar-phosphate backbone on the outside.26 The inner bases form the 
“cross-bars” of the double helix and pair in a specific manner—adenine with thymine and 
guanine with cytosine.27 Each cross-bar is chemically connected to the sugar-phosphate 
                                                          
REV. 787 (2010); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New 
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999); David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent 
Law Adjudication: Precedent and Policy, 66 SMU L. Rev. 633 (2013); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Fed-
eral Circuit, 52 AM. U.L. REV. 771 (2003). 
 17. See infra Part IIA. 
 18. See infra Part IIB. 
 19. See infra Part IIC. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 2 (5th ed. 2008). 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. Id. at 7-8. 
 25. About the Human Genome Pro-
ject, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFO. ARCHIVE, http://web.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project
/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
 26. ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 197. 
 27. Id. at 197. 
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backbone of the DNA double-helix.28 DNA, as it exists in the cell, is packaged into a set 
of chromosomes.29 Each person has forty-six chromosomes—twenty-three from each par-
ent.30 Because a chromosome consists of a long string of unbroken DNA, it is essentially 
a long string of genes.31 
The nucleotide sequence of the DNA within a specific gene determines the amino 
acid sequence of a specific protein.32 The amino acid sequence of a protein determines 
what three-dimensional structure the protein will take, and therefore, what properties it 
will have and what biological function it will serve.33 Not all stretches of DNA code for 
amino acids; those that do are known as “exons,” while those that do not are known as 
“introns.”34 Most human genes consist of a long string of alternating introns and exons, 
with introns generally making up the majority of each gene.35 Consequently, specialized 
enzymes must remove substantial portions of a gene—the introns—before the gene can be 
“expressed” through the synthesis of a protein.36 
2. Protein Synthesis: RNA Transcription and Translation 
The creation of proteins from DNA takes place through two major steps—transcrip-
tion and translation.37 During transcription, enzymes unwind DNA and use it to create a 
strand of complimentary RNA.38 Like DNA, RNA is also a chain-like molecule composed 
of nucleotide subunits.39 Unlike DNA, however, RNA utilizes the base uracil (U) instead 
of thymine and its sugar-phosphate backbone is chemically different from the sugar-phos-
phate backbone of DNA.40 The RNA molecule produced from transcription is known as 
pre-messenger RNA, or pre-mRNA, and contains both introns and exons, like its parent 
strand of DNA.41 A process called splicing removes the introns from the pre-mRNA mol-
ecule and produces a molecule known as final messenger RNA, or mRNA.42 During trans-
lation, an enzyme reads the nucleotide sequence of the mRNA in groups of three, known 
as codons, and translates the codons into amino acids, which the enzyme links together to 
form a protein.43 Often, cells are capable of splicing a segment of DNA in more than one 
way, allowing a single segment of DNA to contain genes coding for several different pro-
teins.44 
                                                          
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 202. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 204. 
 32. Id. at 199. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 206. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 332. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 347. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 367. 
 44. Id. at 348. 
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3. DNA Extraction, Purification, and Synthesis 
A variety of well-established laboratory techniques allow laboratory technicians to 
extract DNA from its cellular environment and manipulate it.45 For example, a scientist 
can produce a purified version of a specific segment of DNA by excising the specific seg-
ment from a sample of extracted DNA.46 The purified segment of DNA may then be am-
plified, or cloned, in unlimited amounts directly through processes such as polymerase 
chain reactions or indirectly using a self-replicating element such as a virus or a plasmid.47 
Additionally, highly automated DNA sequencing techniques can rapidly and accurately 
determine the nucleotide sequence of a molecule of DNA.48 
Complimentary DNA, or cDNA, is a laboratory-synthesized molecule created using 
the process of reverse transcription.49  Reverse transcription is the process of extracting an 
mRNA molecule from a cell and using it as a template to create a complementary chain of 
single-stranded DNA, which cellular enzymes then convert into double stranded DNA.50 
Genomic DNA primarily differs from cDNA in that cDNA contains the uninterrupted cod-
ing sequence of a gene.51  This is because cDNA’s synthesis from mRNA molecules occurs 
after splicing, leaving only a particular gene’s exons remaining.52 For this reason, cDNA 
is the molecule of choice when analyzing a gene’s protein product.53 
A laboratory can use purified and amplified segments of DNA to detect a particular 
nucleotide sequence of interest—most often a gene.54 For example, a scientist can insert a 
radioactive or chemical isotope—a marker—into a single stranded sequence of nucleo-
tides.55 The scientist can then use the sequence as a “probe” to find a complimentary se-
quence within a sample of DNA.56 The scientific community widely utilizes this type of 
probe for the localization, purification, and characterization of nucleic acid sequences cor-
responding to specific genes.57 
B. Patent Law Introduction 
United States patent law dates back to 1790, when the First Congress passed House 
Resolution 10—our nation’s first patent bill.58 Congress passed House Resolution 10 in 
accordance with Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which bestowed 
upon Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
                                                          
 45. See, e.g., id. at 532-48. 
 46. Id. at 552. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 553.  
 49. Id. at 542. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 544. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 552. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2396 (1952). 
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Writings and Discoveries.”59 Congress promptly revised the bill in 1793 to make the grant-
ing of patents essentially automatic so long as the applicant filed the necessary papers and 
fees.60 In 1836, dissatisfaction with the ease at which patents were obtained prompted 
Congress to enact a new bill.61 This new bill created a patent office with the power to refuse 
patents if the inventor did not meet certain requirements.62 Congress substantially revised 
patent laws again in 1870 and a final time in 1952, when it codified the Patent Act still in 
effect today.63 
As noted above, the founding fathers recognized early in our nation’s existence that 
a patent system was vital to the advancement of technology and innovation.64 According 
to traditional patent doctrine, patents incentivize innovation by rewarding an inventor with 
the right to exclude others from the use of his invention for a specified period of time.65 In 
the absence of a patent system, imitators could lie in wait for new inventions and appro-
priate them with a marginal expenditure of resources, while the inventor would lose the 
full benefit of his ingenuity and labor.66 Consequently, inventors would be less likely to 
expend time and energy innovating, and the technological progress of society as a whole 
would proceed at a slower pace.67 Additionally, by giving inventors legal protection from 
those who would exploit their inventions in the absence of patent rights, patent law en-
courages the prompt disclosure of new discoveries to the public.68 Public disclosure of 
inventions is desirable because it provides opportunity for improvement on the original 
invention and for further discovery—both subject to the patent holder’s rights, of course.69 
Unfortunately, some patents may actually impede the development of “downstream” 
innovations that are contingent on the use of a subsequent “upstream” innovation.70 This 
distinction between upstream and downstream resources plays a vital role in the success 
of the patent system.71 The traditional doctrine is built on a system in which innovators 
utilize a freely available pool of upstream resources to develop new downstream technol-
ogies eligible for patent protection.72 Accordingly, a patent system’s effectiveness in pro-
moting innovation relies on its ability to maintain accessibility to requisite upstream re-
sources while providing innovators with sufficient patent protection for downstream 
technologies.73 In the words of the Supreme Court, “patent protection strikes a delicate 
balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and 
‘imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.’”74 
                                                          
 59. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 60. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2397. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2395; see also Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 16, at 1159. 
 64. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2396. 
 65. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:2 (2013). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Peter Lee, Towards a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 929-30 (2009). 
 71. Peter Yun-Hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable 
Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 79, 81 
(2005). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting Mayo 
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The scenario in which a patentable downstream technology also serves as an up-
stream resource for further innovation and discovery often complicates the balance be-
tween these two pools of resources.75 This scenario is particularly common in the biotech-
nology setting, where patents on groundbreaking discoveries have the potential to inhibit 
the development of downstream technologies.76 For example, a patent on recombinant 
gene technology—developed using basic upstream scientific knowledge and techniques—
might inhibit the development of medicines and treatments derived from subsequent use 
of the technology if the patent holder actively enforces his patent rights.77 
Another factor that further complicates the intellectual property landscape of the bi-
otechnology industry is the growing tension between the for-profit and not-for-profit sec-
tors of the research community.78 For the better part of the twentieth century, the academic 
community, which highly valued the sharing of scientific knowledge and generally 
frowned upon claiming property rights in scientific discoveries, conducted the vast major-
ity of scientific research.79 Although the market applicability of fields such as molecular 
biology rapidly increased throughout the century, the lack of any meaningful property 
rights in research results warded off privatization of scientific research until the late 
1970s.80 Around that time, the prevailing view of the legal and economic community 
shifted in favor of stronger intellectual property rights.81 
In an attempt to create incentives for private firms to develop university-based dis-
coveries into marketable products, and also to protect American discoveries from foreign 
exploitation, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.82 The Bayh-Dole Act gave uni-
versities the option to seek patent rights for discoveries made as a result of federally funded 
research.83 The Act’s purpose was to stimulate economic growth by giving private firms 
the opportunity to obtain exclusive licenses to develop commercial applications of univer-
sity-owned technologies.84 The Act facilitated the development of a “technology transfer 
industry” in which universities encourage researchers to pursue commercialization of their 
discoveries.85 Universities now file patent applications on many of these discoveries—
which often serve as valuable inputs into further research—then negotiate licensing agree-
ments that allow private firms to make use of patented discoveries in exchange for royal-
ties.86 
                                                          
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012)). 
 75. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-based Regulation in Patent 
Law, 58 EMORY L. J. 889, 895 (2009). 
 76. See generally, Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticom-
mons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).  
 77. See Lee, supra note 70, at 80. 
 78. Case Comment, Patent Act of 1952 – Patentable Subject Matter – Association for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 388, 388 (2013) [hereinafter Patent Act]. 
 79. Rai, supra note 5, at 89-90; Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1046-48. 
 80. Rai, supra note 5, at 93. 
 81. Id. at 94. 
 82. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)); Rai, supra note 5, at 95-97. 
 83. See Ledbetter, supra note 6, at 315. 
 84. See Rai, supra note 5, at 96-97. 
 85. Anna Bartow Laakman, Restoring the Genetic Commons: A “Common Sense” Approach to Biotechnol-
ogy Patents in the Wake of KSR v. Teleflex, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 48 (2007). 
 86. Id. 
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Two years after the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, Congress created the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit to address growing concerns about the negative effects of 
inconsistent patent decisions in the regional circuit courts.87 Although the Federal Circuit 
does not exclusively hear patent cases, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the na-
tion’s patent appeals.88 The Federal Circuit substantially strengthened patent rights in basic 
research discoveries by liberalizing the utility requirement and holding that DNA discov-
eries satisfy the “nonobviousness” requirement.89 This increase in the patentability of basic 
research, coupled with the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act, led to a marked increase in the 
commercialization of biotechnology research.90 
Consequently, substantial tension developed between the growing private sector and 
its not-for-profit counterparts.91 The private sector maintains that strong patent rights are 
necessary for the attraction of capital investors, who have little incentive to allocate re-
sources to the development of new technologies if those new technologies are readily 
available to competing firms.92 In response, the not-for-profit sector argues that the free 
flow of information best encourages innovation.93 
To settle these conflicting interests, many commentators have argued that substantial 
changes to current patent law are necessary.94 Some have suggested alternatives to tradi-
tional patent rights, including monetary prizes for discoveries, completely new forms of 
intellectual property, compulsory licensing to ensure access at reasonable costs, tax incen-
tives for donations of intellectual property to non-profit organizations, and codification of 
common law safe harbor provisions for non-profit research entities.95 However, until fur-
ther legislative action resolves the complex policy issues associated with biotechnology 
patents, federal courts must resolve highly technical patent law claims within the statutory 
framework of the current patent act.96 
Under the Patent Act of 1952, an invention must meet several statutory requirements 
to be eligible for patent protection.97 First, the invention must concern patentable subject 
matter, a concept discussed in further detail below.98 It must also have utility and novelty, 
it must not be obvious, and it must be properly disclosed.99 The utility requirement derives 
from the language of § 101, which allows the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to issue patents to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
                                                          
 87. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; Rai, supra note 5, at 102-03. 
 88. See S. Jay Plager, The Federal Circuit As an Institution: On Uncertainty and Policy Levers, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 749, 750 (2010). 
 89. See Rai, supra note 5, at 103-09; see also Laakman, supra note 85, at 43, 48-49. An invention satisfies 
the nonobviousness requirement if a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains would 
not consider the invention to be an obvious change from the prior state of the art. See infra note 103 and accom-
panying text.  
 90. See Rai, supra note 5, at 110. 
 91. Indeed, this is precisely the scenario that played out in Myriad. See Patent Act, supra note 78, at 388. 
 92. Id.; Rai, supra note 5, at 95-96. 
 93. See Patent Act, supra note 78, at 388. 
 94. See id. at 397. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112. 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 99. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112; see also Rai, supra note 16, at 829-31. 
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”100 Utility is generally the easiest re-
quirement to satisfy, since courts merely require the invention to have some form of spe-
cific benefit to the public.101 Novelty requires, quite simply, that others did not know of or 
use the invention prior to its discovery by the patentee.102 An invention is obvious if a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains would consider the 
invention to be an obvious change from the prior state of the art.103 Section 112 of the 
patent act requires the patent specifications to contain an adequate written description of 
the invention, which must be sufficiently clear and concise to allow others to make use of 
the invention.104 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Myriad concerns itself only with the question of 
whether the contested patents related to patentable subject matter.105 In fact, the question 
presented in the Association for Molecular Pathology’s petition for writ of certiorari was 
likely one of the most concise in the history of the Supreme Court: Are human genes pa-
tentable?106 
C.  The Supreme Court’s “Product of Nature” Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to the scope of pa-
tentable subject matter for “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”107 
Scholars and commentators refer to the exception as the “natural products” or “product of 
nature” doctrine.108 Two Supreme Court cases, Funk Brothers Seed Company v. Kalo In-
oculant Company109 and Diamond v. Chakrabarty,110 provide an adequate introduction to 
the Court’s “product of nature” doctrine. 
In Funk Brothers, the petitioner contested a patent relating to a bacterial mixture 
used for inoculating plants.111 Prior to the patentee’s discovery of this mixture, the mutu-
ally inhibitory effects of various species of bacterial inoculants on one another necessitated 
the manufacture and sale of each species of inoculant separately.112 However, the patentee 
discovered particular strains of each species that did not exert these mutually inhibitive 
effects.113 He isolated these superior strains of bacteria and used them to create mixed 
cultures suitable for use on a much wider variety of crops than was possible with existing 
inoculants.114 
Although the Court recognized the advantage provided by the discovery and the in-
genuity of its creator, it struck down the patent on the ground that the patented mixture 
                                                          
 100. 35 U.S.C. §101 (emphasis added). 
 101. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 1:12 (West 2014).  
 102. JAMES BUCHWALTER ET AL., C.J.S. Patents §34 (2014).  
 103. HOLMES, supra note 101, § 1:14. 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 112; HOLMES, supra note 101, § 1:15. 
 105. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013). 
 106. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2011) (No. 11-725). 
 107. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 108. Bailey, supra note 1, at 30-31.   
 109. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 110. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 111. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130. 
 112. Id. at 129. 
 113. Id. at 130. 
 114. Id. 
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was merely a discovery of “some of the handiwork of nature.”115 The patentee’s isolation 
of the bacterial strains did not “improve in any way their natural functioning;” the bacteria 
still “serve[d] the ends nature originally provided and act[ed] quite independently of any 
effort of the patentee.”116 Accordingly, the Court determined that the patented mixture fell 
squarely within the product of nature exception to the § 101 definition of patentable subject 
matter and, thus, was not patentable.117 
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court further explained its position on the “product 
of nature” doctrine.118 In Chakrabarty, the patentee was a microbiologist who created, 
through genetic engineering, a bacterium that was capable of chemically degrading several 
components of crude oil.119 The bacterium’s value was in the treatment of oil spills, and 
no known naturally occurring organism possessed the same capability.120 The Court rea-
soned that because the genetically engineered bacterium was different from any found in 
nature, it was patent eligible.121 
The Court distinguished the case from Funk Brothers by explaining that in that case, 
the patentee had simply discovered a strain of bacteria that previously existed in nature.122 
In contrast, the patentee in Chakrabarty created a new bacterium with “markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature.”123 The Court emphasized that patent protection 
is appropriate only for inventions that are products of human ingenuity.124 Although the 
Court decided the two cases differently, the reasoning of the decisions is consistent and 
provides the relevant standards for determining when an invention falls within the “prod-
uct of nature” exception to the scope of patentable subject matter.125 
D. Development of Myriad’s Patents 
Throughout the 1980’s, organizations devoted to breast cancer awareness spurred an 
increase in public and governmental attentiveness to the disease.126 In response to this in-
creased awareness, scientists from many developed countries sought to identify the DNA 
sequences associated with breast cancer.127 In 1990, a group of researchers at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, led by Doctor Mary-Claire King, published a paper linking a 
gene located on a specific region of chromosome 17 to breast and ovarian cancer.128 Dr. 
King’s group had not yet determined the sequence of the gene, which was later designated 
                                                          
 115. Id. at 131. 
 116. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 119. Id. at 305. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 310. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
 124. Id. at 309-10. 
 125. See Bailey, supra note 1, at 32. 
 126. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal rein-
stated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 127. Id. at 201. 
 128. Id. 
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Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene, or BRCA1.129 This discovery led research teams 
around the world to intensify their research concerning the specified region of chromo-
some 17.130 Dr. Mark Skolnick, a co-founder of Myriad Genetics, led one of these 
groups.131 
While earning his Ph.D. in genetics, Dr. Skolnick met three Mormons who intro-
duced him to the Utah Genealogical Society’s resources.132 In 1973, Dr. Skolnick recom-
mended linking the genealogical society’s database to the Utah Cancer Registry’s database 
to analyze occurrences of cancer within families.133 Dr. Skolnick furthered this effort by 
developing a familial cancer-screening clinic, which his group used to study a variety of 
familial cancers.134 After Dr. King’s research group announced the BRCA1 gene’s linkage 
to chromosome 17, Dr. Skolnick created Myriad Genetics in 1991 after his research 
group’s attempts to obtain government funding were not as successful as he hoped they 
would be.135 
Scientists at Myriad located the BRCA1 gene using linkage analysis, meaning that 
the group “mapped” the physical location of the gene within the human genome using 
correlations between the inheritance of certain DNA markers and the occurrence of can-
cer.136 After pinpointing the location of the BRCA1 gene, Myriad’s scientists analyzed the 
sequence of the gene and identified the nucleotides that comprise it.137 Following the dis-
covery, scientists raced to locate a second gene also thought to be associated with breast 
and ovarian cancer.138 Utilizing the same form of analysis it used to locate BRCA1, Myriad 
discovered the BRCA2 gene.139 However, a substantial portion of the scientific community 
holds the view that Dr. Michael Stratton of London’s Institute for Cancer Research was 
actually the first to sequence the BRCA2 gene.140 When all was said and done, Myriad 
obtained seven patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, which gave it the option to 
exercise the exclusive right to perform research and clinical testing on the genes.141 
E. The Importance of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 Genes 
The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes produce tumor suppressor proteins that ensure the 
stability of a cell’s genetic material by facilitating the repair of damaged DNA.142  Inherited 
                                                          
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
 132. Declaration of Dr. Mark Skolnick at ¶ 7, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2009) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). 
 133. Id. ¶¶ 7-8.  
 134. Id. ¶ 10. 
 135. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
 136. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 
1995). 
 137.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 201; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282. 
 138. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 202. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. 
Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 
5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996); U.S. Patent No. 6,033,857 (filed 
Mar. 20, 1998). 
 142. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.can-
cer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (Last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
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mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes can lead to an increased risk of female breast 
and ovarian cancers.143 Together, mutations in these two genes are responsible for twenty 
to twenty-five percent of hereditary breast cancers and fifteen percent of all ovarian can-
cers.144 The existence of mutated BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes, therefore, contains important 
implications for the prevention and detection of breast and ovarian cancers.145 
A patent holder has the option to grant licenses to others for the use of the patented 
item in exchange for an up-front payment or royalty payments.146 In the context of gene 
patents, the patent holder has the option to grant licenses to other entities for the use of the 
gene in diagnostic testing.147 Myriad, however, chose to retain the exclusive right to per-
form diagnostic testing on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes—a decision the scientific com-
munity met with extensive opposition and criticism.148 
Opponents of Myriad’s patents raised the objection that Myriad’s effective monop-
oly on BRCA testing allows it to raise the cost of the test to unreasonable levels.149 Myriad 
offered testing at a cost of over $3,000, while a public healthcare plan in Ontario—which 
chose to ignore Myriad’s patents—offered the testing at approximately one third of Myr-
iad’s price.150 Insurance companies often do not cover BRCA testing, and some of Myr-
iad’s testing options impose extra fees on patients who are not “high risk.”151 Another con-
cern involves the lack of options for consumers; if Myriad is the only choice for BRCA 
testing, a patient who desires a second opinion is simply out of luck.152 During the late 
1990s and early 2000s, Myriad actively enforced its BRCA patents, sending cease and 
desist letters and filing lawsuits against various parties who offered BRCA testing in vio-
lation of Myriad’s patents.153 In May 2009, the Association for Molecular Pathology 
(“AMP”) filed suit against the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and 
Myriad in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking 
invalidation of Myriad’s patents.154  A substantial number of clinical physicians, research-
ers, cancer patients, and public interest groups joined as plaintiffs in the case.155 
                                                          
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.; see also Douglas F. Easton, How Many More Breast Cancer Predisposition Genes are There?, 1 
BREAST CANCER RES. 14, 15 (1999); Pal T et al., BRCA1 and BRCA2 Mutations Account for a Large Proportion 
of Ovarian Carcinoma Cases, 104 CANCER 2807, 2812 (2005).  
 145. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 203. 
 146. Ledbetter, supra note 6, at 317. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. at 314; see generally T. Caulfield, Myriad and the Mass Media: The Covering of a Gene Patent Con-
troversy, 9 GENETICS MED. 850 (2007); Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, 
and TP53 in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 1379 (2006). 
 149. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 203-04. 
  150    Id. 
 151. Id. at 204. 
 152. A related concern is that Myriad’s monopoly over BRCA testing leaves it with little incentive to improve 
upon its original test. See Ledbetter, supra note 6, at 314. 
 153. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 204-06. 
 154. Id. at 186-89. 
 155. Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Innovation Policy in Biotechnology 
Although scholars widely agree that the basic goal of patent law is to promote inno-
vation, legal and economic theorists often fundamentally disagree on how to best imple-
ment that goal.156 The application of the patent system’s general rules to the unique quali-
ties of diverse industries and technologies complicates this debate substantially.157 For 
example, the cost of research and development varies widely across industries.158 Pharma-
ceutical companies often invest millions of dollars and spend several years developing a 
new drug, while software companies can develop a new program for a fraction of that 
cost.159 Consequently, those industries that require vast expenditures for research and de-
velopment will generally covet patent rights more fiercely than those that require compar-
atively modest expenditures.160 
There are several unique qualities of biotechnology that complicate the debate on 
how to best implement the patent system’s goals.161 Biotechnology research is expensive, 
takes place over an extended period of time, and often involves a high degree of uncer-
tainty.162 Even when biotechnology research yields exciting new discoveries, the market 
value of those discoveries is often difficult to ascertain.163 Also, imitators face substantially 
lower risks and costs than original innovators do.164 For example, an imitator can easily 
replicate a particular molecule of cDNA once the original innovator locates and isolates 
the underlying DNA sequence.165 The combination of these two factors lends support to 
the private sector’s argument that the industry requires strong patent rights to entice in-
vestment in important research.166 
However, a countervailing argument is that the field of biotechnology research of-
fers a wealth of alternative incentives that motivate researchers to innovate.167 Whereas the 
patent system incentivizes innovation with monetary rewards, many leading researchers—
often funded by government grants and nonprofit organizations—are motivated by alter-
native incentives, such as prestige, prizes, academic tenure, altruism, or mere scientific 
curiosity.168 In the field of biotechnology, then, it is not unreasonable to argue that a sub-
stantial amount of scientific progress would continue even in the absence of the patent 
system’s incentives.169 Put more generally, an industry with an abundance of alternative 
incentives to innovate should require fewer incentives from the patent system.170 After all, 
                                                          
 156. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1597-99. 
 157. Id. at 1581. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1581-82. 
 160. Id. at 1582. 
 161. Id. at 1676-77.  
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1677. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Brief for Respondents at 5, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013) (No. 12398). 
 167. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1586. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. 
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why should society pay the patent system’s price if a steady supply of inventors not seek-
ing patent exclusivity is available to provide the scientific progress the patent system seeks 
to promote?171 
Such a question depends in part on what kind of scientific progress patent exclusivity 
seeks to promote.172 Under the more traditional account of the patent system, patent ex-
clusivity provides ex-ante incentives that operate prior to the issuance of the patent.173 In 
other words, society benefits from the inventor’s discovery and disclosure of the patented 
invention, and the inventor’s right to exclude others from the use of his invention is the 
price society must pay to hold up its end of the bargain.174 This traditional account of the 
patent system was likely effective when inventions were primarily mechanical in nature, 
but it is problematic when applied to modern sciences such as biotechnology, where an 
initial patented invention often has no market value in and of itself, and further investment 
is necessary to develop commercial applications of the initial invention.175 Furthermore, 
researchers motivated by alternative incentives to innovate, especially those in academia, 
often do not direct their research toward the pursuit of such commercial applications.176 
An alternative theory holds that patents also provide incentives that operate subse-
quent to the issuance of the patent.177 These ex-post incentives motivate the inventor to 
invest in the development of commercial applications of the invention during the patent 
term, or in the alternative, to entice others to invest in developing commercial applications 
through licensing.178 This alternative theory was apparently espoused by Congress when 
it passed the Bayh-Dole Act.179 Congress passed the Act because it determined that feder-
ally funded researchers were not efficiently developing their basic research discoveries 
into commercial applications.180 Its solution to the problem, as noted above, was to nudge 
the biotechnology industry towards commercialization by allowing universities and non-
profit organizations to patent their basic research discoveries and encouraging them to 
subsequently license their patents to private firms, who could develop them into commer-
cial applications.181 
Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg have argued that the Bayh-Dole Act’s 
failure to distinguish fundamental research discoveries that enable further scientific inves-
tigation from downstream inventions that translate directly into commercial products 
caused the patent system to encroach too far into the domain of open science, which may 
impede rather than promote the progress of science.182 This concept is directly applicable 
                                                          
 171. See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1037. 
 172. See id. at 1024, 1037. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 16, at 1155; see also Rai, supra note 5, at 96. Some 
scholars distinguish invention from innovation; notable economist Joseph Schumpeter, for example, has argued 
that invention produces “no economically relevant effect at all,” while innovation brings about constant change 
in the economic system. 1 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 84-87 (1939). 
 176. Gina A. Kuhlman, Alliances for the Future: Cultivating a Cooperative Environment for Biotech Success, 
11 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 311, 314 (1996). 
 177. Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1036-38. 
 178. Id. 
 179. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980). 
 180. Rai, supra note 5, at 95. 
 181. Brian Zadorozny, The Advent of Gene Patenting: Putting the Great Debate in Perspective, 13 SMU SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (2009). 
 182. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & 
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to Myriad; the question of whether DNA patents encroach too far into the domain of open 
science—so as to impede the progress of science rather than promote it—is the overarch-
ing question of innovation policy presented by the case.183 
In an attempt to aid and influence the courts in their resolution of Myriad, both par-
ties to the case and numerous amici offered a plethora of policy arguments.184 Myriad and 
similarly situated amici, largely consisting of for-profit entities, argued that Myriad and its 
investors relied on strong patent rights when they “risked billions of dollars” to research 
the BRCA genes, and therefore, Myriad needed patent exclusivity in order to recover its 
investment in the molecules.185 Other amici warned that a holding in the plaintiffs’ favor 
would have significant negative effects on America’s economy and on its position as a 
leader in the biotechnology industry.186 
Plaintiffs and their amici, consisting primarily of not-for-profit members of the re-
search community, offered a variety of arguments to the contrary.187 First, they argued that 
the incentivization of innovation does not always require patent exclusivity, especially in 
the context of genetic research.188 For example, scientists have developed genetic testing 
for an assortment of diseases without pursuing patent rights, and Myriad’s competition in 
the race to discover the BRCA genes came from scientists claiming to have no intention 
of seeking patents on the genes.189 
Also, plaintiffs and associated amici argued that patent exclusivity impedes progress 
by preventing further downstream research and discovery.190 Myriad’s amici responded by 
arguing that members of the biotechnology industry rarely enforce patents against re-
searchers, but the argument fell on deaf ears.191 Plaintiffs and their amici asserted that the 
mere threat of litigation—and the resulting attorney’s fees and court costs—often prevents 
researchers from taking the risk, especially those employed by non-profit entities.192 In 
Myriad’s case, the fact that several plaintiffs ceased BRCA testing and research to settle 
                                                          
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290-91 (2003). 
 183. Unfortunately, both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit largely avoided addressing this question. 
Patent Act, supra note 78, at 397.  
 184. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae American Medical Association, American Society of Human Genet-
ics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Osteopathic Association, American Col-
lege of Legal Medicine, and the Medical Society of the State of New York in Support of Petitioners, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) [hereinafter AMA Brief]; 
Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Neither Party, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) [here-
inafter Lander Brief]; Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398).  
 185. Brief for Respondents at 5, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398); see also Patent Act, supra note 
78, at 394. 
 186. Brief for Amicus Curiae the Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of Respondents at 3, Myr-
iad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No 12-398) [hereinafter Biotechnology Brief]; see also Patent Act, supra note 78, 
at 394. 
 187. Patent Act, supra note 78, at 394. 
  188   See, e.g., AMA Brief, supra note 184, at 16 (stating that “[t]he majority of geneticists are willing to 
undertake the research to discover genes and develop genetic tests without the possibility of a patent”). 
 189. See id. at 16; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners at 21, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
 190. See Brief for Petitioners at 42, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398); Brief Amici Curiae of the 
National Women’s Health Network et al. in Support of Petitioners at 12-14, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 
12-398). 
 191. See, e.g., Biotechnology Brief, supra note 186, at 33 (stating that, in the biotechnology industry, “rational 
forbearance against researchers is the norm”). 
 192. Brief of Amicus Curiae AARP in Support of Petitioners at 4, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No 12-398); see also Patent 
Act, supra note 78, at 395. 
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pending lawsuits, while others did so to avoid litigation altogether, gave credence to the 
argument.193 Lastly, plaintiffs and their amici argued that communication and collabora-
tion, not exclusivity, are vital to scientific discovery.194 To foster innovation, the scientific 
community needs certain basic tools and scientific knowledge to remain in the public do-
main.195 For example, Myriad built its discovery of the BRCA genes on the work of other 
scientists, including that of the Human Genome Project and Dr. King’s University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley research team.196 
B. The Litigation Saga 
In March of 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York invalidated all seven of Myriad’s patents.197 In doing so, the court split the patents 
into two categories and struck each category down for a different reason.198 One category 
of patent claims pertained to “isolated DNA containing all or portions of the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 gene sequence[s].”199 The court found these “composition of matter” claims un-
patentable based on the product of nature exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101.200 The second 
category of patents were those based on “methods for ‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ BRCA1 
and BRCA2 gene sequences to identify the presence of mutations correlating with a pre-
disposition to breast or ovarian cancer.”201 The court invalidated this second category of 
patents because it found that they were abstract mental processes, which are also not eli-
gible for patent under § 101.202 
On July 29, 2011, Myriad appealed and brought the case before the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.203 The Federal Circuit presented a three-part de-
cision: (1) “isolated” DNA molecules do not exist in nature and are thus patent-eligible, 
(2) Myriad’s claim to a method for screening potential cancer therapeutics is not an ab-
stract mental process and is also patent-eligible, and (3) Myriad’s method claims pertain-
ing to “comparing” or “analyzing” DNA sequences are patent-ineligible abstract mental 
                                                          
 193. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 204-06 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated 
sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion vacated, 
appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
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 194. Patent Act, supra note 78, at 396. 
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 200. Id. at 185, 220. 
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 202. Myriad, relying on the Federal Circuit’s decision in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services, argued that the method claims were not abstract mental processes because they incorporated a transfor-
mation step and therefore passed the “machine or transformation” test from Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010). Id. at 233-37. The district court disagreed, holding there was no transformative step involved in Myriad’s 
“comparing” and “analyzing” method claims. Id. at 234-37; see also infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text. 
 203. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(2012), and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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processes.204 The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which asked the Supreme 
Court to review the Federal Circuit’s decision relating to the patentability of isolated hu-
man genes.205 The Court issued a summary disposition206 that granted the plaintiffs’ peti-
tion for writ of certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case 
to the Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of the Court’s recent decision in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.207 
In Mayo, the patents at issue related to methods for determining, in a patient-specific 
manner, the most effective dose of thiopurine drugs used for the treatment of autoimmune 
diseases.208 The method used correlations between metabolite levels in a patient’s blood 
and the likelihood of ineffectiveness or negative side effects to precisely establish the 
proper dose.209 Mayo, interestingly, was itself a case in which the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, vacated a Federal Circuit decision, and remanded for reconsideration in light of 
a recently decided case—Bilski v. Kappos.210 The Federal Circuit’s pre-remand decision 
in Mayo determined that the claims at issue were eligible for patent under the “machine or 
transformation” test.211 In Bilski v. Kappos, however, the Supreme Court held that the ma-
chine or transformation test was not “a definitive test of patent eligibility, but only an 
important and useful clue.”212 The Court seemed to be hinting that it wanted the Federal 
Circuit to incorporate some form of policy into its analysis of patent eligibility.213 On re-
mand, the Federal Circuit determined that, even if the machine or transformation test was 
not the definitive test of patent eligibility, its application to the claims in Mayo led to a 
clear and compelling conclusion that the claims at issue were eligible for patent.214 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari a second time and reversed the Federal Circuit’s deci-
sion.215 Although the Court purported to rely on established general legal rules and case 
law precedent, it also referenced its own repeated emphasis on the concern that patent law 
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into a different state or thing.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. 
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).  
 212. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (explaining the significance of 
its holding in Bilski); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
 213. The Court’s reiteration that its holding in Bilski stood for the proposition that the machine or transfor-
mation test was not the sole test for determining the patent eligibility of process or method claims suggests that 
its remand of Mayo was effectively an invitation for the Federal Circuit to engage in a more flexible, policy-
inclusive analysis of whether the claims in dispute were eligible for patent. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 
S. Ct. at 1296. 
 214. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 
S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 215. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
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should not “inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of na-
ture” as reinforcement of its decision.216 
After reconsideration of its Myriad holding in light of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Mayo, the Federal Circuit produced a carbon copy of its prior holding.217 The Federal 
Circuit reasoned that Mayo was not controlling on the issue of patent-eligible subject mat-
ter under § 101.218 It further explained that while Mayo “provide[d] valuable insights and 
illuminate[d] broad, foundational principles,” the Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers cases 
set out the framework for determining patent-eligibility of composition of matter claims.219 
Accordingly, the court held that Mayo did not affect its prior holding that isolated DNA 
molecules are within the realm of patent-eligible subject matter.220 The Federal Circuit 
then moved on to Myriad’s method claims; it determined that Mayo reinforced its previous 
holding that the method claims directed to “comparing” or “analyzing” DNA sequences 
were patent-ineligible and that the method claim for screening potential cancer therapeu-
tics was patent-eligible.221 Plaintiffs again filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking the 
Supreme Court to determine whether human genes are patent eligible and whether the 
Federal Circuit erred in upholding Myriad’s method patent for screening potential cancer 
therapeutics.222 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari only on the question of whether human genes 
are eligible for patent.223 Although the Court received a substantial number of policy-based 
arguments from the case’s numerous amici, it largely evaded the policy issue by basing its 
decision on rules developed in its previous case law.224 The Court offered a narrow, two-
part holding: (1) a segment of DNA is a product of nature which is not patent-eligible by 
virtue of its isolation from the human genome, and (2) cDNA is not naturally occurring 
and is therefore patent-eligible.225 To arrive at this decision, the Court compared Myriad’s 
patents to those in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, examined the focus of the patents, and 
determined that the past practice of the USPTO in granting patents for isolated genes was 
not entitled to deference.226 
The Court began its analysis by distinguishing Myriad’s isolated DNA patents from 
the patent in Chakrabarty.227 In Chakrabarty, the genetically engineered bacterium had 
“markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”228 In contrast, the Court 
determined that Myriad did not create anything; the separation of the BRCA genes from 
                                                          
 216. Id. at 1301-02, 1305. 
 217. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013). 
 218. Id. at 1325. 
 219. Id. at 1326. 
 220. Id. at 1333.  
 221. Id. at 1326. 
 222. Plaintiffs again included the standing question in its petition, and the Supreme Court again ignored it. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
(No. 11-725). 
 223. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 695. 
 224. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-17. 
 225. Id. at 2109. 
 226. Id. at 2116-19. 
 227. Id. at 2116-17. 
 228. Id. at 2117 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 
(1980)). 
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the human genome may have been a groundbreaking discovery, but it was no act of inven-
tion.229 The Court found the subject matter of Myriad’s isolated DNA patents to be more 
analogous to the subject matter of the patent considered in Funk Brothers.230 In Funk 
Brothers, the Court’s primary objection to the patent was that its mixture of bacterial 
strains did not alter the bacteria in any way.231 Similarly, the Court found that Myriad did 
not create or alter the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in any way.232 Rather, Myriad’s contri-
bution was “uncovering” the location and sequence of the genes within their respective 
chromosomes.233 
Myriad attempted to distinguish its isolated DNA patents from the Funk Brothers 
patent by emphasizing that isolating DNA from the human genome requires severance of 
chemical bonds, resulting in a non-naturally occurring molecule.234 The Court acknowl-
edged and dismissed this argument, stating that Myriad had not expressed its patent claims 
in terms of chemical composition.235 Rather, the isolated DNA claims primarily focused 
on the genetic information encoded in the patented genes, which existed without any con-
tribution from Myriad.236 The Court illustrated this point by explaining that, if Myriad’s 
patents depended on the creating a unique molecule, a patent infringer could avoid Myr-
iad’s patent claims by isolating a DNA sequence containing the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene 
and one additional nucleotide pair.237 Such an outcome would obviously frustrate the pur-
pose of Myriad’s patents, because its claims concerned the information encoded within the 
genes, not their chemical composition.238 Myriad’s final argument on the issue was that 
the USPTO’s past practice of awarding patents on genes was entitled to deference.239 The 
Court quickly dispatched this argument, noting that the United States itself, as amicus cu-
riae, argued against the practice of granting patents on isolated DNA sequences.240 Ulti-
mately, the Court held that Myriad’s isolated DNA patents fell squarely within the product 
of nature exception, rendering them invalid.241 
The Supreme Court addressed Myriad’s cDNA patent claims much more con-
cisely.242 The AMP conceded that cDNA is in no way a naturally occurring molecule, but 
argued that it should not be eligible for patent because its nucleotide sequence is dictated 
by nature and not by the laboratory technician.243 The Court acknowledged the truth of the 
premise underlying the AMP’s argument, but reasoned that the laboratory technician still 
                                                          
 229. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 2116. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. However, Dr. Eric Lander asserted in his amicus brief that the scientific 
community has long been aware of the occurrence of isolated DNA fragments in the human body. Lander Brief, 
supra note 184, at 12. The Court gave considerable attention to Dr. Lander’s brief on this point during oral 
argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-40, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118. 
 239. Id. 
 240. The Court provided further support for its conclusion by discussing Congress’ failure to legislatively 
endorse the USPTO’s longstanding practice of granting genetic patents. Id. at 2118-19. 
 241. Id. at 2117. 
 242. See id. at 2119. 
 243. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119; Brief for Petitioner at 49, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398). 
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unquestionably creates something new when he synthesizes cDNA.244 The Court held that 
a molecule of cDNA is distinct from the molecule of DNA from which it was created.245 
Consequently, cDNA is not a product of nature, making it patent eligible under Section 
101 of the Patent Act.246 
C. Policy Avoidance and Missed Opportunity 
The Supreme Court asserted in Mayo that Congress holds the responsibility of craft-
ing finely tailored rules to resolve industry-specific issues of patent policy.247 While Con-
gress has shown a tepid willingness to pass industry-specific patent legislation, it has done 
so in a piecemeal fashion rather than promulgating comprehensive statutes to fully address 
the needs of any one industry.248 Some commentators have suggested that the biotechnol-
ogy industry should have its own sui generis patent system, but Professor Rai argues the 
legislature is as ill-equipped as the courts to provide a permanent solution to the industry’s 
ever-changing and amorphous patent needs.249 Unless Congress chooses to undertake this 
seemingly herculean task, the courts must resolve patent disputes by interpreting the ex-
isting Patent Act, which remains largely unchanged since 1952.250 However, if the last six 
decades of technological advancements and emerging industries have not prompted Con-
gress to make any substantial changes to update patent law, it is plausible that Congress is 
satisfied with the ability of the federal courts to adapt their reading of the Patent Act to 
accommodate the unique demands of diverse industries and technologies.251 
Unfortunately, the institutional constraints faced by the federal courts leave them ill 
equipped to reconcile the disparate interests held by different sectors of the biotechnology 
industry.252 One such constraint the federal courts face is that of limited resources.253 An-
other is that federal courts often lack technical competence.254 For example, judges on the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which was created primarily to adjudicate patent 
cases, are not required to have technical backgrounds—and most do not.255 Even a judge 
with a technical background, however, could not hope to be technically competent in the 
all of the vastly diverse disciplines within the scope of the Patent Act.256 
                                                          
 244. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304-05 (2011). 
 248. For example, Congress has extended the patent term for many pharmaceutical patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-
56 (2000), prohibited enforcement of medical procedure patents against doctors, id. § 287 (2000), and relaxed 
the obviousness standard as it applies to biotechnology processes, id. § 103(b) (2000). See also Burk & Lemley, 
Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1631. 
 249. Professor Rai argues that the difficulties associated with biotechnology arise not from legal standards 
themselves, but instead from the courts’ faulty application of the standards. Rai, supra note 16, at 841-42. She 
then provides three objections to the promulgation of a sui generis regime for biotechnology patents: (1) special 
interest groups may have substantial influence over the resultant legislation, (2) the administrative costs would 
be significant, and (3) there is no reason to believe that a sui generis approach would provide sufficient flexibility 
to accommodate the ever-changing nature of the biotechnology industry. Id. at 842. 
 250. See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-212. 
 251. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1674. 
 252. Rai, supra note 99, at 837. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 837-38. 
 255. Id. at 838. 
 256. Id. at 837-38. 
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The proper role of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme 
Court in their interpretation of the Patent Act is the subject of much debate.257 Some com-
mentators adhere to the view that, in light of the complex nature of patent law, the courts 
should avoid policy considerations altogether and implement a formalistic and rule-based 
approach to their intellectual property jurisprudence.258 Indeed, the judges of the Federal 
Circuit have generally indicated that they should avoid expressing their own policy views 
in written opinions.259 This view is in accord with the traditional notion that the judiciary 
should exercise restraint against implementing its own policy preferences when interpret-
ing statutory language.260 On the other hand, a seemingly overwhelming portion of the 
academic community advances the view that the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
should more actively analyze innovation policy in patent cases.261 
Rather conveniently, professor David Taylor recently published a thoughtful article 
that neatly gathered the critical views of several notable professors on the perceived for-
malistic nature of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.262 Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss, for 
example, has argued that the Patent Act requires “common law elaboration,” and that Fed-
eral Circuit judges should consider “whether the law is developing in a manner that reflects 
policies that meet the needs of the creative sector and further federal interests in promoting 
technological progress.”263 Professor Rai has also criticized the Federal Circuit’s formal-
ism.264 She has advanced the argument that the history and language of the Patent Act 
suggest that Congress intended to delegate patent law policymaking to the judiciary, which 
should accept this responsibility by incorporating innovation policy into its patent law ju-
risprudence.265 Several other professors have expressed similar views,266 and although each 
has his or her own unique take on the Federal Circuit’s appropriate role, a common thread 
exists: the Federal Circuit should do a better job of articulating policy-based justifications 
for its holdings in patent cases.267 
Although commentators have directed the bulk of their criticisms toward the Federal 
Circuit, the Supreme Court has not altogether escaped similar scrutiny.268 However, the 
general consensus among commentators is that the Supreme Court has been much more 
open to discussing innovation policy in its patent cases.269 Perhaps more importantly, the 
                                                          
 257. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16, at 640-52. 
 258. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1673-74. 
 259. Taylor, supra note 16, at 640-45. 
 260. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1673-74. 
 261. This criticism is more often aimed at the Federal Circuit; some commentators argue the specialized nature 
of the court and the failure of other institutions to take responsibility for establishing patent policy make it the 
best option to articulate substantive patent policy. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16, at 645.  
 262. Id. at 645-52. 
 263. With respect to patent law’s need for “common law elaboration,” Professor Dreyfuss compares the Patent 
Act to the Sherman Act. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit 
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELY TECH. L. J. 787, 800, 801 (2008); see also Taylor, supra note 16, at 648. 
 264. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging in Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1101-03 (2003); see also Taylor, supra note 16, at 649. 
 265. Rai, supra note 264, at 1040-41. 
 266. See generally Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419 (2012); 
Thomas, supra note 16; Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16. 
 267. Taylor, supra note 16, at 652. 
 268. Id. at 672. 
 269. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (explaining why the nonobviousness 
standard needed to be raised); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732-35 
(2002) (justifying retention of the doctrine of equivalents); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 
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Supreme Court has expressed a willingness to engage in a discourse with the Federal Cir-
cuit on how to best implement innovation policy in patent cases.270 Unfortunately, the Fed-
eral Circuit has not consistently expressed the same willingness to participate in this dis-
course.271 
Similar to its remand in Mayo, the Supreme Court’s remand of Myriad presented a 
prime opportunity for the Federal Circuit to implement innovation policy into its opin-
ion.272 That the doctrine at issue—subject-matter eligibility—was one not closely circum-
scribed by the language of the Patent Act ads weight to this argument.273 This is not nec-
essarily to say that the result would have been different if the Federal Circuit had done so; 
even if it determined that innovation policy discouraged DNA patents, it might have been 
constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis.274 By engaging in a reasoned analysis of inno-
vation policy, though, the Federal Circuit could have framed the issues more thoroughly 
for the Supreme Court, enabling it to make effective use of the Federal Circuit’s expertise 
without necessarily deferring to its judgment.275 Additionally, such a policy analysis would 
have supplied the district courts with a better understanding of how to address subject-
matter eligibility in the future.276 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court responded to the Federal Circuit’s avoidance of 
innovation policy with its own avoidance of the same.277 This is especially surprising given 
that the Court’s opinion in Mayo seemingly took a step toward incorporating innovation 
policy into its subject-matter eligibility analysis.278 Its subsequent avoidance of innovation 
policy in Myriad will likely foster uncertainty in the lower courts about the proper role of 
innovation policy in the nation’s patent law jurisprudence moving forward.279 Thus, alt-
hough the Supreme Court’s holding in Myriad appears to strike a desirable balance be-
tween the competing interests of the biotechnology community, the Supreme Court and 
the Federal Circuit nevertheless missed a valuable opportunity to engage in a meaningful 
discourse about innovation policy and its proper role in the courts’ patent law jurispru-
dence. 
A possible justification for the Court’s avoidance of innovation policy in Myriad is 
its lack of expertise and experience with patent law.280 It may have decided that avoiding 
a policy analysis altogether was a better alternative to a possibly faulty or incomplete pol-
icy analysis, especially given the controversial nature of the patent claims at hand.281 In-
                                                          
U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that granting too much patent protection 
can run counter to the constitutional objective of patent protection); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 801-03; 
Taylor, supra note 16, at 637. 
 270. Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 801-02. 
 271. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 16, at 674. 
 272. See supra nn.208-16 and accompanying text. 
 273. Subject matter eligibility is not closely circumscribed by statute because the language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
leaves much of the doctrine’s application to the discretion of the courts. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 678. 
 274. See id. It is important to note, however, that the en banc Federal Circuit is not bound by its own precedent. 
Id. at 656. 
 275. See id.; Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 796. 
 276. Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 805. 
 277. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116-20 (2013). 
 278. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304-05 (2011). 
 279. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-20. 
 280. See Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 802. 
 281. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116-20. 
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deed, some might applaud the Supreme Court’s abstention from articulating issues of in-
novation policy that the Federal Circuit could arguably address more effectively.282 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The application of the patent system to biotechnology discoveries presents complex 
issues of innovation policy.283 Legal and economic theorists rarely agree on how to best 
resolve these issues, but a substantial portion of commentators agree that the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court should incorporate some form of rea-
soned policy analysis in their patent law jurisprudence.284 Although Myriad presented a 
clear opportunity for the two courts to engage in a discourse about the proper role of inno-
vation policy in the resolution of patent cases, neither court took advantage of this oppor-
tunity. Unless such a discourse is established in the future, innovation policy’s place in 
United States patent law jurisprudence will remain a question mark. 
—Dru Prosser* 
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